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NATURE, KANT, AND GOD
Gordon Graham
This paper draws on some lines of thought in Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
to construct an aesthetic counterpart to the moral argument for the exis-
tence of God that Kant formulates in the Critique of Practical Reason. The 
paper offers this aesthetic version as a theistic way of explaining how the 
natural world can be thought valuable independently of human desires and 
purposes. It further argues that such an argument must commend itself to 
anyone who is as deeply committed to the preservation of nature as to the 
promotion of justice.
I
The environmental movement has attained moral and political prominence 
across the globe with astonishing speed. Accompanying the call to envi-
ronmental responsibility is the search for a philosophy to undergird it. An 
early contributor to this search, J. Baird Callicott, observed that “the central 
and most recalcitrant problem for environmental ethics is the problem of 
constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for nonhuman entities 
and for nature as a whole.”1 It is easy to see why this question is crucial. 
There are undoubtedly many human benefits to be wrung from nature, 
and simple prudence endorses an attitude of intelligent stewardship as a 
counter to pollution and wastefulness. But environmentalists have gener-
ally looked beyond simple stewardship and have sought to root attitudes 
to nature on what they sense to be its intrinsic value.
Just how we should conceive of “intrinsic” value is a complex phil-
osophical issue. Is intrinsic value the same as “good in itself?” Are 
intrinsically valuable things always good in themselves, or is their good-
ness conditional upon the ends to which they are put? These and related 
questions have generated a very considerable philosophical literature.2 At 
a minimum, however, we can say that intrinsic value is to be contrasted 
with instrumental value in just this sense: intrinsic value both transcends 
and puts limits on the uses human beings may make of it. To say that the 
1Callicott, “Intrinsic Value,” 257.
2See for instance, Harman, “Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value”; Korsgaard, “Two 
Distinctions in Goodness”; Hurka, “Two Kinds of Organic Unity”; Wielenberg, “Goodness 
without Qualification”; and Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value.”
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natural world has intrinsic value, then, is to say that it has a value other 
than its capacity to serve human ends.
However deep-seated the intuition that nature has intrinsic value in 
this sense, on inspection it often turns out that attempts to articulate and 
defend it do in the end rely on connecting the natural world with human 
well-being. Currently, the commonest and most persuasive argument in 
favor of environmental responsibility makes appeal to anticipated eco-
logical crises—notably global warming, coastal flooding, environmental 
pollution, soil erosion—and it lays the emphasis firmly on concern for 
future generations. These two features—the invocation of crisis and 
the focus on a relatively distant future—can undoubtedly serve as a 
powerful counter to the claims of short- or even medium-term mate-
rial benefit. They prompt us to base our deliberations on considerations 
beyond the calculable economic and technological advantages that can 
be obtained from the exploitation of, for instance, fossil fuels, tracts of 
virgin forest, potentially arable land, or deep sea fishing grounds. Never-
theless, though the welfare of future generations wholly unknown to us 
provides a perspective that may be said to look beyond our customary 
moral parameters and to call for a rather wide-ranging conception of 
responsibility, insofar as it is grounded in future human benefit, it still 
qualifies as “shallow” rather than “deep” ecology, to employ Arne Naess’s 
useful distinction.3
In seeking to avoid such “shallowness,” an alternative approach rests 
its case on the beauty, grandeur and profusion of the natural world (what 
I shall henceforth call its “magnificence”). Of course, to the extent that 
this approach grounds the value of natural beauty in human recreation 
and pleasure—wildlife tourism, arctic cruises and the like—it too fails to 
transcend the limits of anthropocentrism, and it has the further weakness 
that, since it need make no appeal to any ecological crisis, it has much 
less traction in contemporary moral and political debate. Yet for the 
purposes of this paper, a focus on nature’s magnificence is philosophi-
cally more promising, and more interesting, than environmental causes 
centering on impending disasters and the human suffering that will flow 
from them.
The conviction that natural magnificence has intrinsic value is for the 
most part a matter of intuition, and intuitionism of any kind invites philo-
sophical suspicion, because appeals to “intuition” so easily mask simple 
prejudices. At the same time, it is plausible to hold that with respect to 
certain matters, the very attempt to explain or defend their value is deeply 
misguided. Consider, for instance, the innocence of children. The person 
who sees nothing wrong with lewd drawings of children, provided no 
rights are violated or harm done, thereby displays a kind of insensitivity 
that in all likelihood no argument could remedy. More importantly, any 
attempt to supply an argument could itself be regarded as too great a 
3Naess, “Shallow and Deep.”
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concession to depravity, because it supposes that the value of innocence 
is derived from something else. And that is precisely the supposition that 
those who value the innocence of children want to resist. A similar point, 
without the language of depravity perhaps, might be made about nature’s 
magnificence. The person who requires an explanation as to why such 
magnificence should be valued, it could be said, thereby exhibits the mind 
of the vandal, someone already deficient in the sensibility that matters. 
This is someone to whom no persuasive explanation can be given, and to 
whom none should be offered. If they remain unmoved by landscape, sea-
scape, and so on, then the only available argument is one that points away 
from nature to its parasitic benefits—the profits of ecotourism or the sale 
of cameras, for example. But these arise from the fact that other people 
relish such things.
Whether or not this defense of intuitionism is correct, it does seem to 
be the case that the urge to preserve natural magnificence, and to resist 
its destruction, rests very largely on a basic evaluation that people have 
come to share, rather than relying on a calculation about anticipated 
future benefit. It is certainly possible to be or to become hardened or 
indifferent to natural magnificence. Moreover, people can reasonably dis-
agree about just what things do and do not possess it. Nevertheless, it is 
comparatively easy to find clear instances in which we can both uncover 
and rely on a sensus communis about the value and importance of nature 
in some of its aspects. The wholesale slaughter of African elephants, the 
near extinction of the Siberian tiger, and the destruction of the Amazo-
nian rainforest and the Great Barrier Reef are widely regarded as serious 
losses by people who are ignorant of the long-term consequences of these 
losses. And this attitude persists even in those cases where it can be shown 
that human welfare is largely unaffected. Perhaps truly disastrous pros-
pects for human life might rightly compel us, reluctantly, to accept such 
losses. Nevertheless, this extreme possibility is compatible with holding 
that in the normal case the value of natural magnificence cannot properly 
be offset or compensated for by increased medical or economic benefits. 
It is in virtue of this common, basic and non-instrumental attitude that 
we may speak of the magnificence of nature having transcendent value, a 
value, that is to say, that is not derived from human good and bad. Still, 
even those who could not be accused of a vandalistic attitude to nature, 
or indifference to its beauty and magnificence, might reasonably ask for 
some account of this intrinsic value. The reasonableness of this request 
explains the centrality of the question for environmental ethics. How is 
such an account to be given?
II
The previous paragraph employed the expression “sensus communis,” a 
term that makes a well known appearance in Kant’s third critique—the 
Critique of Judgment. For the larger part of this work, Kant is concerned 
with the subject of beauty and its relation to art, but in an important 
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appendix he returns to a topic that figures prominently in the second 
Critique, namely, arguments for the existence of God. Kant aims to under-
mine the traditional ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments 
and to offer a moral argument in their place.
This new argument has three features that are of special significance 
for my purposes. First, it grounds religious faith in practical rather than 
speculative or theoretical reason. That is to say, it connects the existence of 
God with rightness and the rationality of action, rather than with truth and 
the rationality of belief. Second, the argument takes as its starting point an 
intuitive conviction—that the demands of the moral law are inescapable. 
Third, here (as elsewhere) Kant’s purpose is to uncover presuppositions 
necessarily required by practical rationality, rather than to draw infer-
ences validated by deductive, or inductive, reasoning.
Despite the fact that Kant’s later, and lengthier, elaboration of this 
moral argument is to be found in the appendix to a book devoted for the 
most part to aesthetics, the connection between the two is, at best, some-
thing towards which he merely gestures. On a straightforward reading, 
the main text’s treatment of taste, beauty, imagination, genius, and so on, 
seems largely independent of the arguments about God that follow in the 
appendix. At the same time, occasional remarks suggest the possibility of 
forging a rather closer connection between the two. If the existence of God 
is a necessary presupposition required to validate our basic conviction 
that the moral law is inescapable, might it not also be the case that the 
existence of God is a necessary presupposition required to validate our 
basic conviction about the magnificence of nature? My aim in this paper 
is to explore precisely this question, and to ask whether a Kantian argu-
ment might provide an answer to environmental ethics’ central question. 
Plainly, the cogency of this question rests upon the validity of Kant’s moral 
argument—or rather, on the supposition that an argument of the kind that 
Kant elaborates could be valid, even if the specific version he offers us is 
not. For my own part, I believe that there is indeed a valid version of the 
moral argument,4 but it is evidently beyond the scope of this paper to 
defend such a contention. Instead, I shall be concerned solely with the 
issue of whether or not there could be an aesthetic parallel to Kant’s moral 
argument.
On the face of it, it seems there could not be. Kant’s argumentative 
strategy relies crucially on a radical distinction between theoretical and 
practical reason, and it is only within the sphere of practical reason that 
the argument can be shown to work. Famously, however, Kant declares 
aesthetic judgment to be non-practical. As his now familiar doctrine has 
it, aesthetic judgment has only “the form of purposiveness,” which is to 
say, purposefulness without purpose.5 Subjective aesthetic pleasure can 
be combined with objective aesthetic judgment only if the intentionally 
4See Graham, Evil and Christian Ethics.
5Kant, Critique of Judgment, §§10–11.
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purposeful form of something is wholly separated from any purpose that 
we might make it or want it to serve. Such at any rate is Kant’s claim, and 
if this is true, the conviction that nature has aesthetic value cannot serve 
as a starting point for an argument about the presuppositions of practical 
reason. Aesthetic judgment is not, and cannot be, an exercise in practical 
reason. Since it concerns only the form of purposiveness; it is, he says, “in 
no way practical.”6
There are a number of replies that might be made to this objection. 
One obvious response is simply to reject the radical distinction between 
practical and theoretical reason. Another is to deny that the value we in-
tuitively perceive in nature is aesthetic. Neither of these responses seems 
to me promising. First, the distinction between practical and theoretical 
reason is crucial to the argument we are trying to parallel, so abandoning 
it would leave us with no argument at all. Secondly, the conviction upon 
which any parallel argument would rest is the intuition of a value in na-
ture that is wholly non-utilitarian and yet sensuous. Natural magnificence 
transcends both human welfare and human pleasure, but nonetheless 
elicits our admiration and wonder. This is exactly how Kant conceives 
of beauty, so that aesthetic value, or something very like it, seems the 
most plausible candidate for the content of our intuitive conviction 
about nature.
A third possible response to the difficulty I identified accepts the cen-
trality of practical reason, but questions Kant’s contention that aesthetic 
judgment is non-practical. This is not an entirely novel move to make. Kant 
clearly wishes to locate aesthetic judgment somewhere between cognition 
and action, and his account of this middle ground has been so influential, 
that it has made the Kantian aesthetic the preferred philosophy under-
lying most versions of the belief in “art for art’s sake.” Nevertheless, Kant’s 
conception of the purposelessness of art has regularly been called into 
question by the existence of architecture. Function and purpose seem no 
less intrinsic to a work of architecture than form. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that an architectural folie is defective, but in purpose not in form. It 
is conceptually indistinguishable from a “walk-through” statue precisely 
because it serves no function. If Kant is right, then, architecture cannot be 
an art, properly speaking. That is to say, insofar as it is purposeful it is not 
aesthetic in the fullest sense.
III
That architecture is not, properly speaking, an art is an implication Kant 
appears willing to accept. Insofar as architecture is a fine art, he says, a 
drawing of a building is as good as the building itself.7 A little later, he 
remarks that any useful purpose a building serves necessarily imposes 
6Kant, Critique of Judgment, §12.
7Ibid., §14.
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a limit on its aesthetic value. Its beauty is “attendant,” but never “free.”8 
“One would be able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in 
the intuition of it if only it were not supposed to be a church,” he tells us.9 
This reveals something very important about his account. Aesthetic judg-
ment is essentially a matter of contemplation. The perspective is always 
that of a viewer, never the user. This explains why the example of a rose 
appears again and again in his account of aesthetic taste. No one knows, 
he says, what a rose is for. It just is. And though we can of course use 
roses as gifts or decorations, and make money out of selling them for these 
purposes, the aesthetic attitude is one of pure contemplative delight in the 
form of the rose as it is.
The existence and nature of a distinctively aesthetic attitude of this kind 
has been debated ever since, but whatever view we take on this subject, 
there is no denying that art and beauty have at least this connection with 
action; they are not merely encountered or cultivated, but made—in the 
form of paintings, poems, pieces of music, and so on. Nor does Kant mean 
to deny this. Indeed he devotes a significant part of the third Critique to 
the subject of “genius” which he characterizes as “a talent for art, not for 
science.”10
It is not easy to say exactly how, on Kant’s account, the “genius” of 
the artist relates to the “taste” of the audience. He addresses the point 
explicitly in §50. This is entitled “On the combination of taste with genius 
in products of beautiful art,” and it concludes with this sentence: “For 
beautiful art, therefore, imagination, understanding, spirit, and taste are 
requisite.”11 The general idea seems to be that the artist is inspired to make 
works that freely flow from the imagination. By itself the necessarily “law-
less freedom” of this imagination can produce “nonsense,” so it needs to 
be “brought into line” by the judgment of taste, which determines whether 
there is aesthetic value to be discovered in it.
If anything must be sacrificed in the conflict of the two properties in one 
product, it must rather be on the side of genius: and the power of judgment, 
which in matters of beautiful art makes its pronouncements on the basis of 
its own principles, will sooner permit damage to the freedom and richness 
of the imagination than to the understanding.12
In a post-Romantic art world that tends to value artistic “expression” over 
“tastefulness,” this decidedly unequal relationship between artist and au-
dience is unlikely to win much support. But it should be noticed that Kant 
does assign artists a key role. Genius is not necessary for beauty—there is 
8The distinction between “free” and “attendant” beauty is not necessarily to be inter-
preted as normative—i.e., “superior” and “inferior.” Still, “free” beauty clearly has an 
autonomy that “attendant” beauty lacks.
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the rose, after all—but it is uniquely productive of beauty. That is to say, 
beauty can be made as well as found, and at the heart of its making lies a 
distinctive act of mind that produces “aesthetic ideas.”
“Aesthetic idea” is another notably Kantian conception. He defines it 
as follows:
The aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with 
a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial rep-
resentations in the free use of the imagination that no expression desig-
nating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows 
the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which 
animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of 
language.13
This passage is difficult to understand. For present purposes, however, I 
shall draw the following inference from it. Beautiful art (or a lot of it) has 
quasi-cognitive as well as sensuous content. When we contemplate a great 
work of art we do not merely delight in its appearance—color, shape, tone, 
organization, and so on—but in the profusion of thoughts and imagin-
ings that it stimulates within us. Kant finds aesthetic ideas at their most 
evident in the art of poetry:
The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the 
kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc., as well 
as to make that of which there are examples in experience, e.g. death, envy, 
and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., sensible beyond the limits of 
experience, with a completeness that goes beyond anything of which there 
is an example in nature.14
This concept of “aesthetic idea” is helpful in explicating an important 
dimension of artistic and aesthetic assessment that a simple reliance on 
beauty cannot accommodate. Within the category of the beautiful, it 
seems, we can distinguish between the more and less profound. A simple 
folk tune and a major symphony can both be beautiful, as can a short story 
and a novel on the scale of Tolstoy’s War and Peace. To rank the second 
above the first, therefore, we need to find some criterion other than beauty. 
At the same time, this second criterion must not remove either object from 
the realms of the aesthetic, as say, an appeal to their respective contribu-
tions to recreation, historical knowledge, or moral improvement would 
do. Kant’s conception of the degree to which they make things “sensible 
beyond the limits of experience” is just such a criterion, though he gives 
no indication that he would use it in this way. Still, it seems right to say 
that if beautiful productions do give sensuous expression to things that 
are beyond the limits of human experience, then they do not merely have 
aesthetic form, but also realize or embody aesthetic ideas.
13Ibid., §49.
14Ibid.
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IV
The intuitive sense we have of nature’s magnificence seems to require a 
similar sort of distinction. A single rose is not any less beautiful than a 
sunset over snow-covered mountains, and yet in contemplating the latter 
it is difficult to think that its beauty exhausts the experience, and tempting 
to find in it what Wordsworth describes (in the Prelude) as “a sense of 
something far more deeply interfused.” What should we say about this 
difference? In common with many writing in the eighteenth century, Kant 
combines his philosophy of beauty with a philosophy of the sublime, 
and it might be supposed that in what he says about it there is material 
that could address this question, especially since he expressly locates the 
“feeling of the sublime” in the experience of nature.
Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunderclouds towering 
up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes 
of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with 
the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set in a rage, a lofty 
waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our capacity to resist them into an 
insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the sight of them 
only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find 
ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these objects sublime because they el-
evate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover 
within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives 
us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness 
of nature.15
In this (unusually) eloquent paragraph, Kant’s concluding sentence is 
especially significant. The experience of the sublime is not meaningful for 
anything that it communicates about nature, but for what it tells us about 
ourselves. Such experiences show that the human mind need not be domi-
nated by an immediate fear of nature’s dynamic power. It has a way of 
accommodating the terrors, namely, by apprehending them in the imagi-
nation. Kant distinguishes between experiences of the sublime prompted 
by nature’s dynamism, and those prompted by nature’s magnitude. The 
great wildebeest migration, a simultaneous movement of well over a mil-
lion animals that takes place in Northern Tanzania and Kenya each year, 
is an example that fits Kant’s account well. The person who sees this tor-
rent of animals apprehends their magnitude, but cannot comprehend it. 
That is to say, as we watch the migration we see at a glance a number so 
great that we know we could not count it. The feeling of the sublime—of 
a sensuous apprehension that somehow goes beyond the limits of experi-
ence—arises because this spectacular natural event prompts us to rejoice 
in a fact about ourselves. We find in ourselves a power to apprehend that 
which seemingly we cannot comprehend, and yet at the same time we know 
that this is an illusion. There is no mystery; we could in principle count all 
the wildebeest, no matter how many there may be.
15Ibid., §28.
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Contrary to what we might initially suppose, then, “the sublime,” at 
least by Kant’s account, will not serve to explicate the transcendent value 
of natural magnificence. Insofar as we are seeking to articulate a widely-
held intuitive conviction that the magnificence of nature presents us with 
a value that sets a limit to human aspiration and endeavor, there is no re-
source that will help us in the Kantian sublime. That is because the feeling 
of the sublime, as Kant analyses it, arises precisely from an understanding 
of how nature in all its power and magnitude does not limit us. The ap-
prehension of the sublime reveals to us something about our own nature, 
not the nature by which we are surrounded.
V
Let us return to the question that prompted this brief exploration of the 
sublime. Kant gives us a conceptual framework in which to articulate 
the idea that “great” works of art differ from simple works, not by being 
more beautiful, but by expressing or embodying “aesthetic ideas.” That 
is to say, such works have the ability to give sensuous representations of 
rational ideas a sort of “completeness” that is greater than is ever to be 
found in everyday experience, even when that experience is summarized 
in empirical generalities. So, for instance, in Shakespeare’s Othello, we find 
the intertwining of love and jealousy more adequately represented in the 
imagined events and poetic language of a drama than it could ever be in 
the recounting of an autobiographical episode from real life. One impor-
tant result of this is that our minds go beyond merely aesthetic delight in 
the acting and the scenery, or even in the poetic beauty of the speeches. We 
are prompted to think about the theme of the play in relation to human 
experience as a whole.
Could there be aesthetic ideas of this kind in nature? In an interesting 
footnote to the section on aesthetic ideas, Kant refers admiringly to a pic-
ture inspired by the inscription over the temple of Isis (or Mother Nature). 
The inscription runs “I am all that is, that was, that will be, and my veil 
no mortal has removed.” The “vignette” Kant describes as “rich in sense” 
was printed as the frontispiece of an introduction to the theory of nature 
by the physicist and mathematician Johann Andreas Segner. Kant’s foot-
note suggests that he shared Segner’s view that this visual representation 
was the most effective way to “dispose the mind [of the student] to solemn 
attentiveness.” Now it is plausible to think that, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, Kant has here articulated something very close to the idea 
that nature can have a value that transcends and so puts limits on human 
action. This is not entirely surprising, of course, since the original inscrip-
tion to which Kant refers had religious purposes. Rich sensual experience 
(of the picture) prompts thoughts about the natural world (that its deepest 
secrets must remain hidden from human investigation) while inducing a 
certain feeling or state of mind (respect and solemnity) that is properly in 
accord with these thoughts.
172 Faith and Philosophy
Segner’s frontispiece is a sensible representation of an abstract idea, 
and its being a representation makes it a work of art, not of nature. The 
difference is this. By judging it beautiful, we attribute to the picture the 
subjective purpose of aesthetic judgment—finding it beautiful. But we can 
also attribute an objective purpose to it, namely the artistic genius’s pur-
pose in making a representation that embodies aesthetic ideas. Kant thinks 
that natural objects can be beautiful, and thus be objects of the subjective 
purpose of aesthetic judgment, but he is emphatic in his contention that 
no empirical observation of nature’s teleology—which is to say, its internal 
functionality—can warrant the attribution of objective purpose, however 
careful or comprehensive that observation might be. As evolutionary 
biology has shown, the most impressive functional relations in nature can 
be explained without recourse to the objective purpose of a divine (or any) 
designer. Strictly, though, art and nature are not mutually exclusive in this 
respect. If a natural object were also a representation of an aesthetic idea, 
then it could have objective as well as subjective purpose.
It is at this point that we might try to find an aesthetic counterpart to 
Kant’s moral argument. Evolutionary biology has indeed shown, let us 
agree, that even the most intricate and impressive functional relations in 
nature can be explained without recourse to the objective purpose or in-
tentional design of a supernatural Creator. If this is the case, then contrary 
to the proponents of Intelligent Design, it is futile to try to undermine 
Kant’s contention about the impossibility of inferring an objective purpose 
from the evident teleology of nature. If we parallel the moral argument, 
however, a different prospect opens up. It now seems that we might un-
cover the conditions of the possibility of practically significant intuition 
with respect to natural magnificence.
Such an argument would proceed as follows.
1. We have an intuitive conviction that there is something about the 
magnificence of nature—its beauty, grandeur and profusion—that 
demands to be accepted and respected as a deontological limit on 
the pursuit of human benefit.
2. Such a conviction is intelligible only if the phenomena that prompt 
it—sunsets, seascapes, teeming forests, spectacular movements of 
wild life, and so on—are more than merely suitable objects for judg-
ments of taste.
3. To be more than this, they must embody aesthetic ideas, and can 
only do this if they are emanations of “genius.”
4. Human genius is powerless to embody aesthetic ideas in such natu-
ral phenomena.
5. Therefore, it is a necessary presupposition of our intuitive conviction 
about the magnificence of nature that there exists a supernatural 
“genius.”
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When Aquinas lays out his “five ways” to the existence of God, he con-
cludes each “proof” with some such remark as “and this is what everyone 
understands by God,” or more simply “and this we call God.”16 My “aes-
thetic proof,” it seems plain, requires a similar move—the addition that 
the supernatural genius presupposed by natural “magnificence” is what 
everyone understands by God. On what basis is such an addition to be 
grounded? Furthermore, there is a critical question lying just below the 
surface of proposition 3 in the argument as it stands. Kant is clear that the 
nature studied by science is “mechanical” in its operations. If this is true, it 
seems impossible to regard it at the same time as an embodiment of “free 
beauty.” Yet if, as step 3 supposes, that which can be explained by natu-
ralistic processes can also be a “representation” of the idea of those same 
processes—if a particular seascape can, for instance, represent the sea’s 
boundlessness—it must be the case that that which is “mechanical” can 
also be “free.” In short, there is a problem about how the law governed 
character of the natural world that science discloses could be compatible 
with the freedom that is required for the same natural world to embody 
the “aesthetic ideas” that emanate from God’s “genius.”
A satisfactory response on both these matters—the identification of “the 
supernatural genius” with “God,” and the tension between mechanical 
nature and “free beauty”—is crucial to this aesthetic argument’s being 
truly analogous to the moral argument for God’s existence that Kant of-
fers us in the Critique of Practical Reason. With respect to the first we may, 
at a minimum, say this. It is a recurrent theme in theology that God’s cre-
ative activity has an importantly aesthetic component that sits alongside 
wisdom and goodness. “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the 
firmament shows his handiwork,” Psalm 19 famously declares, and Psalm 
50 tells us that “Out of Zion, perfect in its beauty, God reveals himself in 
glory.” “Where were you,” the LORD asks Job, “when the morning stars 
sang together” (Job 38:7)? This is just one of a long series of rhetorical 
questions whose effect is to underline the truth that the grandeur and 
magnificence of God’s creation vastly exceed both the knowledge and the 
moral righteousness to which humans (rightly) aspire. In the Book of Rev-
elation the same theme comes to a kind of culmination. John’s description 
of the City of God is replete with references to beauty. Precious stones, 
pure gold and clearest crystal are called upon as images which, despite 
their acknowledged inadequacy, may nevertheless point towards the 
glory of God. More strikingly perhaps, in the envisioned City, the glory 
of God replaces the sun and the moon, with the implication that our ap-
preciation of their beauty in the created world is a poor reflection of the 
glory of God yet to be revealed in the world to come. In other words, the 
sum of God’s perfections comprises not only omniscience, omnipotence, 
and omnibenevolence, but glory. This fact usefully connects the idea of 
16Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Q. 2, A. 3.
174 Faith and Philosophy
God with the supernatural “genius” whose aesthetic ideas, on my recon-
structed Kantian argument, are embodied in the magnificence of nature.
With respect to the tension between the “mechanical” nature disclosed 
by science and the “free” beauty the natural world invites us to contem-
plate, it is worth observing that this is simply one more dimension of a 
tension within the whole framework of Kant’s thought, one that even he 
himself acknowledged. It arises even more markedly in his moral philos-
ophy. Human beings are both rational agents and physical objects. How is 
the freedom that their moral agency requires to be made compatible with 
the physical determinism that must govern them as bodies? In the Ground-
work to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant accepts that he cannot resolve this 
tension. He argues, however, that this is not to be regarded as a debili-
tating failure. In these matters, he says, “human reason in general cannot 
make comprehensible [the moral law] as regards its absolute necessity,” 
but we “nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility” and that “this 
is all that can be required of a philosophy that strives in its principles 
to the very boundary of human reason.”17 The same strategy might be 
employed with respect to the apprehension of aesthetic ideas in nature. 
We cannot show that the laws of science allow the freedom within nature 
that such ideas necessarily require. What we can show, however, is that 
the assumption of such freedom is a necessary condition of apprehending 
the magnificence of nature. It follows that this orientation to the natural 
world is thus radically different to the one that science adopts. But this is 
no more (nor less) troubling than the agent/object duality of human nature 
with which we are obliged to live.
VI
Two further aspects of the parallel between Kant’s moral argument and 
the aesthetic version I have sketched are worth noting. Kant regards the 
inescapability of the moral law, the proposition on which his moral ar-
gument rests, as beyond debate. We cannot avoid that which morality 
requires us to do by the simple strategy of denying that we are under 
an obligation to do it. For most of us, this is probably a supposition we 
are unlikely to question. But the philosophical significance of Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy of Morality is that it persuasively opens up the possibility that 
this modern sense of inescapability is socio-psychological rather than 
logical, a product not of rational understanding but of deep-seated fear 
and resentment. These psychological dispositions have become institu-
tionalised in social formations shaped by the distorting dichotomy of 
moral good versus evil. Nietzsche’s purpose is to liberate us from this 
dichotomy, by going “beyond good and evil.” If he were successful in 
this, it would show that the cogency of Kant’s moral argument is entirely 
dependent upon our acceptance of its basic assertion. Freed from our 
obsession with absolute good and evil, we would no longer accept the 
17Kant, Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals.
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condition upon which it rests, and thus have no reason to subscribe to its 
necessary presuppositions.
Now whether Nietzsche is right or wrong in his ambitious contention, 
the mere possibility he has uncovered shows that the familiar dictum 
“One person’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens” applies in 
this case. Consequently logical validity cannot settle the matter by itself. 
“If the moral law is inescapable, then God must exist” is not logically su-
perior to “God does not exist, so there is no inescapable moral law.” And 
as Nietzsche also rightly contended, atheists (such as “the English moral-
ists” he despised) rarely see the full implications of the second contention.
They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the 
more firmly to Christian morality. . . . [O]ne has to reassert one’s position 
in a fear-inspiring manner as a moral fanatic. . . . Christianity is a system, a 
consistently thought-out and complete view of things. If one breaks out of it 
a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to 
pieces: one has nothing of any consequence left in one’s hands.18
Among the things that one no longer possesses, on Nietzsche’s account, 
is the morality that lays special emphasis to the plight of the poor and the 
vulnerable, as well as the morality that believes in human equality and 
proscribes the violation of human rights. Suppose that Nietzsche is right, 
not in the details of his genealogy, but in his claim about its implications. 
If so, we are presented with a choice. Shall we abandon our moral convic-
tions on the strength of his genealogy (modus tollens), or shall we reject his 
genealogy on the basis of our moral convictions (modus ponens)? In most 
minds, I conjecture, a commitment to justice, to the relief of suffering, and 
to the protection of the vulnerable runs so deep, that there is a powerful 
motive for favouring modus ponens over modus tollens. If atheism means re-
linquishing justice and charity, subscription to it is too high a price to pay.
Now it is not so obvious (to me) that a similar point holds when ap-
plied to the demands of “respect for nature.” Should it prove to be the 
case that the basic conviction that we have about nature’s magnificence 
is incompatible with atheism, it is much less clear that there would be 
something inhuman about reasoning in accordance with modus tollens 
rather than modus ponens. Though it would be difficult to demonstrate, 
somehow a concern for justice seems much more basic to our evaluative 
consciousness than the urge to protect the magnificence of the natural 
world. There appears to be a major moral difference between, for instance, 
the exploitation of nature and the enslavement of human beings. The 
latter seems evil in a way that the former, however reprehensible, is not. 
Still, the extent and rapidity with which “green” movements have found 
support in widely differing social and political contexts does indicate that 
many people have (perhaps increasingly) profound commitments to what 
are called “environmental values.” Such people will have as good reason 
18Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, §5 (emphasis in original).
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to favor modus ponens over modus tollens in the aesthetic argument, as the 
advocates of justice and rights do in the moral version.
A further important issue is this. Kant’s non-consequentialist morality 
is often interpreted, mistakenly, as implying subscription to the (suppos-
edly ancient) slogan Fiat justitia ruat caelum (“Let justice be done though 
the heavens fall”). But in the second Critique, Kant’s explication of the 
moral argument relies no less heavily on the rationality of the pursuit of 
happiness than it does on the rationality of morality. Indeed, what brings 
the existence of God into view is the all-important fact that justice and 
prudence can come into radical conflict. Kant does not conclude (as some 
interpretations of “Kantianism” suggest) that rationality requires us, 
whenever such a conflict arises, always to take the side of morality. On 
the contrary, he thinks that rationality requires us to relinquish neither 
our duty nor our happiness, but to have faith in their ultimate harmo-
nization. This is not a “conceptual” harmony in which “virtue is its own 
reward,” nor a material harmony brought about by human law or political 
organization since it is not achievable in this world. The reconciliation of 
virtue and happiness can only be accomplished by a God whose justice 
and benevolence extends beyond the grave.
[I]n the mere course of nature happiness exactly proportionate to moral 
worth is not to be expected and is indeed impossible. . . . [T]herefore the 
possibility of the highest good from this side cannot be granted except under 
the presupposition of a moral Author of the world.19
It is at this point we can identify an important parallel with the duality 
of human need on the one hand, and the profusion and magnificence of the 
natural world on the other. Those who make nature a God after the fashion 
of (for instance) James Lovelock’s Gaia can suppose no such harmonious 
resolution to environmental crisis. The result is that their message is “either 
concession or defeat.” “There are no grounds for thinking” Lovelock tells 
us, “that what we are doing [with our environmentally destructive life-
style] will destroy Gaia, but if we continue business as usual, our species 
may never again enjoy the lush and verdant world we had only a hundred 
years ago. What is most in danger is [human] civilization.”20 By contrast, 
the God who is a necessary presupposition in the aesthetic argument I 
have sketched is a God who has made the earth a fit habitation for human 
beings, and therefore a God who may be relied upon to harmonize the 
furthering of human welfare with the preservation of the natural world’s 
integrity. The form, and timescale, of this harmonization falls beyond the 
scope of meaningful speculation, of course. God’s time is the best time, but 
not our time, we might say. That is why, in emulation of Kant’s moral argu-
ment again, the basis of action with respect to nature has to be faith rather 
than calculation or prediction.
19Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 150.
20Lovelock, The Revenge of Gaia, 60.
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The “aesthetic argument for the existence of God” that I have fabri-
cated out of elements in Kant’s Critique of Judgment will evidently be 
found unpersuasive by those who do not share the conviction that natural 
magnificence has transcendent value. For those in whom this conviction 
is correspondingly strong, on the other hand, its theistic conclusion may 
be unwelcome. This does not rob it of all interest, however. The central 
issue in environmental philosophy, in my estimation, is how to escape 
“shallow” ecology. If the argument just elaborated is indeed a cogent one, 
this shows that theism is one way of avoiding shallow ecology. An in-
tellectual obligation thus falls on those who venerate the natural world 
and want to protect it against human exploitation, but do not want to call 
upon God. They have to show that there is some alternative, because in 
the absence of such an alternative, they face a suitably amended version 
of Nietzsche’s accusation against the English moralists—that however 
deeply felt their conviction about the importance of nature’s magnificence, 
they are merely “reasserting their position in a fear-inspiring manner as 
environmental fanatics.” Without a theistic grounding for that conviction, 
so my argument goes, they are open to the accusation that their moral 
affirmation is little more than table pounding.
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